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50 
Trade unions ... were born of the necessity of workers 
to protect and defend themselves from encroachment, 
injustice, and wrong . ... 
To protect the workers in their inalienable right to a 
higher and better life; to protect them, not only as 
equals before the law, but also in their rights to the 
product of their labor; to protect their lives, their limbs, 
their health, their homes, their firesides, their li!Jerties as 
men, as workers, as citizens; to overcome and conquer 
prejudice and antagonism; to secure them the right to 
life, and the opportunity to maintain that life; the right 
to be full sharers in the abundance which is the result of 
their brain and brawn, and the civilization of which they 
are the founders and the mainstay. 
Address of 
Samuel Gompers, 1898 
... there is a nice ring to the idea of workers participat-
ing in the decisions needed to co"ect the wrongs they 
have unwittingly been committing upon themselves, 
their neighbors, and, incidentally, the rest of us. 
Jesse Etelson, 
Legal Assistant to a member of 
the National Labor Relations Board, 1970 
I Prologue 
The UAW and Environmental Bargaining 
Heady with his re-election that day as President of the 
International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft, and 
Agricultural Implement Workers (UAW), Walter P. 
Reuther addressed the delegates to the union's 1968 
convention: 
What we are talking about is making the labor movement into 
a vital force, a creative force that can begin to take the lead in 
the mobilization of the broad force in America who need to be 
mobilized if we are going to be equal to dealing with the 
complex problems we face in the difficult years ahead. 1 
Specifically, Reuther was talking about developing 
young leaders from the shops "with stars in their eyes", 
fighting racism, ending "18th century" attitudes about 
technology in relationship to low-cost housing, creating 
a set of common-bargaining goals among all auto- · 
producing nations of the world, and {most important to 
this paper) turning labor's power and money loose on a 
host of problems from building beautiful cities to 
cleaning the air. 2 
Whether Reuther was getting back to basics or altering 
course to meet the modern mood of workers was not 
clear. Traditionally, Reuther had felt strongly that laboI 
and the community had common interests, on the other 
hand, the rank and file have been characterized as almost 
solely concerned with "bread and butter" issues. But 
now the rank and file were changing. Reports indicated 
that skilled workers were losing interest in further wage 
increases since every wage increase seemed to get lost in 
higher prices. Young workers in the UAW-by the 1960's 
death was opening the ranks of the UAW and over 40% 
of its members were under 30-and black militants no 
longer responded to the rigid discipline of auto industry 
management. Union leaders could· not ignore this fact; 
the director of the UA W's Skilled Trades Division 
indicated that he was taking the issues to the bargaining 
table: 
... we just have to tell these companies that, in the spirit of 
youth, the king is dead and we are going to bury him in 
1970. 3 
The issue here was management discipline. 
Reuther, meanwhile, himself demonstrated a continuing 
interest in obtaining clean air. When John Lindsay and 
mayors of eight other major American cities presented 
to the presidents of the Big Three (GM, Ford, Chrysler) 
their plea for voluntary pollution controls and a joint 
task force of industry, union, and city officials to 
recommend solutions in the fight against air pollution, 
Walter Reuther was there.4 
Before the UAW's 1970 convention, Reuther was 
signalling primary interest in wages, pensions, and a 
cost-of-living clause without a ceiling. 5 These were the 
bread and butter issues. But three days later, the 
convention also issued a call for an Environmental Bill of 
Rights for Americans and the delegates promised that 
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the UAW would bargain for a reduction in the pollution 
emission level of the cars they assembled. In a declara-
tion released to the press, the delegates maintained that 
industry must be forced to accept responsibility for cleaning 
up pollution and wastes its processes and products have 
created.6 
Reuther had long contended that labor's gains must not 
be at the expense of the community; now his convention 
pledge to turn "labor's power and money loose" on 
American problems was nearing reality. By Labor Day of 
1970, Reuther intended to have a new set of contracts 
with Detroit or to be embarking on the union's first 
strike against General Motors in nineteen years. The 
UAW had over $105 million amassed in its strike 
"Reuther was talking about. .. 
turning labor's power and 
money loose on ... problems 
from building beautiful 
cities to cleaning the air." 
fund-there was money and power to "turn loose" on 
the auto industry. 
On May IO, 1970, Reuther, his wife and two friends, 
were killed in the crash of their small, chartered jet just 
miles short of their destination, the $ 20 million family 
education center in northern Michigan the UAW was 
buildi~ to develop young leaders "with stars in their 
eyes." 
Leonard Woodcock was elected the new president of the 
UAW; union writers indicated that he would downplay 
the social issues so important to Reuther. 8 Possibly 
signifying a change in strategy9 and an admission by 
Woodcock of the slim chance the UAW had of success-
fully negotiating an effective anti-pollution clause in the 
upcoming collective bargaining talks with General 
Motors, the UAW and six major conservation groups 10 
appeared before Congress on July 11, 1970 and called 
for the creation of air pollution guidelines so harsh that 
they would banish the internal combustion engine from 
the automobile within five years. 11 
As preparation for bargaining moved into higher gear, 
the UAW delivered thirty-five position papers to each of 
the major automakers in mid-July 12 but by September 
10th, as contract talks neared the strike deadline, the 
UAW removed twenty-four non-economic demands 
related to senority, promotion, transfer and working 
hours according to press reports. 13 Whether the demand 
for pollution free autos was included in the original 
thirty-five papers and was removed in the subsequent 
paring down of issues is not clear. But from all 
appearances, the UAW's hope of collectively bargaining 
an agreement on auto pollution was dead. 14 
In November of 1970 the UAW and General Motors 
settled the strike. 16 Coincidentally with the settlement 
of the strike, the newly created Environmental 
Protection Agency announced the pollution standards 
for automobiles which would be produced in 1972 
through 1974. 17 
The federal government's requirement that auto 
pollution emissions be reduced almost completely by 
1975 was the force which finally altered General Motors 
policy. 18 The genesis of the federal government 
standard was the stipulation by the city of Los Angeles 
and the state of California that automobiles produced in 
California or imported into the state meet stringent 
anti-smog standards. The automakers opposed this 
regional regulation both because of the effect it would 
have on California auto sales and because of its wasteful 
allocation of research resources. The only way GM could 
rationally internalize the cost of smog prevention was 
for there to be an industry-wide requirement 19 that all 
automobiles produced for the American market meet a 
nation-wide auto pollution standard. GM (and especially 
the other automakers) needed to fix the market. As with 
seat belts and shoulder harnesses, federal regulation was 
the most satisfactory method of accomplishing this 
guarantee. 
With the promulgation of federal standards there was no 
longer a need for the UAW to make such demands on 
the automakers. Nevertheless, the UAW had introduced 
a new idea into the portfolio of tactics for obtaining 
corporate social responsibility. 
II Labor Union Motivation and 
Environmental Collective Bargaining 
Reuther's ability to have the emmission issue placed on 
the union's bargaining agenda is tentative proof that 
labor unions will bargain for environmental issues. But it 
is difficult to draw generalized conclusions about labor 
union motivation from this single effort of the UAW. 
First, actual bargaining never took place. 20 Second, 
Reuther's role in the UAW may have made the UAW 
unique compared to other national labor unions. 21 
It may have been that the reason the UAW never went to 
the bargaining table with General Motors on these 
environmental issues was because impending federal 
regulations eliminated the need for such bargaining. The 
Environmental Protection Agency had held hearings on 
the proposed pollution standards for 1972 through 1974 
autombiles during the summer of the UAW bargaining 
talks with General Motors, and the official standard was 
promulgated in November of 1970, less than two 
months after the environmental issues were dropped 
from the UAW's bargaining package. 22 
51 
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On the other hand, Leonard Woodcock may have 
wanted to strengthen his position in the UAW. He may 
have felt that the untested, non-bread-and-butter issue of 
clean air would endanger the negotiations with General 
Motors and weaken his standing with the rank and file of 
the UAW. Many members of the UAW expressed doubts 
that their national leaders should be spending so much 
time with "frivolous" issues, when wages and other 
direct benefits were at stake. It was reported that as the 
strike deadline neared, opposition to the pollution-
standard clause mounted. 23 During the strike, when 
Woodcock announced that the UAW would allow 
members to comply with General Motors' request that 
workers on pollution and safety projects be allowed to 
return to work while the strike continued, 24 5000 
members of Local 160 employed at GM's massive 
Technical Center in Michigan, ignored Woodcock's offer 
and remained off the job. 25 This would indicate, as 
most everyone must suspect, that controlling the 
exhaust of automobiles does not represent the first 
priority for many of the rank and file of the UAW. 
Reuther's role in the UAW certainly makes it difficult to 
draw any broad conclusions about the activities of other 
labor unions in relation to environmental issues. Among 
labor leaders, Reuther always held distinctive, but 
minority views about the roie of labor in society. 26 In 
1947, he astounded General Motors and management 
throughout the nation when he requested that GM open 
their books so that the UAW's wage demands could be 
based on GM's ability to pay. 27 Throughout his career, 
Reuther wanted a greater voice for labor in industrial 
planning; he felt industry kept production down to keep 
prices up and he wanted to use automation to keep 
purchasing power abreast of productivity. 28 To 
Reuther, "Labor must go forward with the community, 
not at the expense of the community." 29 
In large part, it may have been Reuther's influence and 
prestige within the UAW which accounted for the 1970 
convention pledge to demand of General Motors a 
contract agreement that automobiles be equipped with 
effective pollution control systems. But the leadership of 
the UAW goes far deeper than one man. Leonard 
Woodcock has been on the forefront of many social 
issues since taking office as the president of the UAW; 
moreover the General Counsel at Solidarity House has 
also been actively preparing papers and collective 
bargaining proposals which explore the full legal 
ramifications of environmental activities of unions. 30 
Other national unions have also engaged in the struggle 
for a cleaner environment and safer world. The United 
Rubber Workers negotiated the nation's first major 
environmental clause in a collective bargaining agree-
ment this year. They convinced the large tire companies 
to contribute half a cent per man hour to conduct 
research on the "harmful factors in the working 
environment" and to develop a "toxicological surveil-
lance" system. 31 
Reportedly the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers tried 
without success to negotiate environmental clauses and 
the Steelworkers, the Pulp, Sulphite, and Paper Mill 
Workers, and the Communications Workers are exploring 
the potential of such clauses. 32 
In addition, at least two locals went on strike in 1970 
over issues which included pollution controls. 33 And in 
1971, Local 2693 of the Steelworkers struck their 
employer when management refused to use a better 
grade of coal in its coke ovens to reduce air pollution in 
the community. The workers did not go back until 
management started burning the better grade of coal. 34 
But there are many indications that the rank and file is 
not enamored with environmental issues, especially 
when the issues impinge on jobs. Just as the UAW Local 
at the General Motors Technical Institute refused to 
support the environmental concerns of the UAW 
president, so other locals are opposing the environmental 
programs of their national unions. 35 
While the Pulp, Sulphite, and Paper Mill Workers is 
seriously considering industry-wide pollution-control 
bargaining at the national level, its Local 119, which 
represents workers in the paper mills which line the 
Flambeau River in Wisconsin, has been actively lobbying 
state officials to extend the deadline for compliance by 
the paper mills with new waste-treatment standards. Mill 
workers who have never fished before are now seen 
hauling in large catches from the river. They are trying 
to save their jobs by showing that the pollution of the 
Flambeau River is not serious. When the president of 
Local 119 appeared before state officials recently, he 
went armed with pictures of the long strings of fish and 
signed statements attesting to the excellent fishing 
conditions on the scenic Flambeau. 36 
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Studies have indicated that there is a large gap between 
the views of national labor leaders and the leaders of 
local unions and the rank and file. 37 While the 
environmental backlash of the local unions attests to 
such a discrepency in views concerning pollution 
standards, national labor leaders are affirmatively 
responding to this backlash by incorporating job 
protection into their support of environmental issues. 
The national president of the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic 
Workers, a national union known for its tough stand on 
pollution, recently announced, 
We will oppose those theoretical environmentalists who would 
make air and water pure without regard to whether or not 
poeple have food on their tables. 38 
With jobs at stake, the solution may be to insure that 
jobs are not lost, or that job assistance is provided~ when 
pollution, safety, and consumer standards are imple-
mented by the government, the corporation, or the 
union. Labor leaders suggested such assistance in Senate 
testimony last spring and at least one environmental 
group, Friends of the Earth, hopes to establish a 
rapprochement with labor groups by including such 
assistance to workers in their environmental legis-
lation. 39 
There is a suspicion among environmentalists and some 
labor leaders that corporate threats of loss of jobs are 
"environmental blackmail" and that unity between labor 
and ecology can call this bluff of business. Recently, a 
union and ecological group in Marietta, Ohio, made just 
such a "call" when Union Carbide threatened to layoff 
650 workers if compliance with state pollution standards 
was forced. But the union and environmentalists stood 
fast and now Union Carbide is attempting to minimize 
layoffs while it complies with the pollution standards. 40 
Nevertheless, the problem remains that some layoffs will 
occur-and those layoffs may be sufficient to sour the 
local union on further environmental action against their 
plant. 
In these examples of union support and lack of support 
of environmental causes, there is no clear indication that 
unions will respond positively to the environmental 
crisis. The internalization of the costs of externalities 
adversely affects the economic position of the corpora-
tion; this has a detrimental effect on the employees of 
that corporation. Only in the long-run does either the 
corporation or the worker stand to gain, for it is only 
over time (and apparently adjustments in iricome 
distribution) that the new and more efficient allocation 
of resources provides to each member of society the 
benefits of optimized allocation. There is, to say the 
least, no obvious, short-tenn economic incentive for the 
worker or the union to actively pursue environmental 
issues. 41 
There are seven factors which I would like to suggest 
which deserve consideration to detennine if it is likely 
that unions at all levels of their organization-from the 
rank and file to the leaders of the locals to national 
officials-will support environmental bargaining. These 
are (I) environmental harms fall especially heavily on 
the working class; (2) in increasing numbers, workers 
have significant amount of "discretionary income;" (3) 
more and more workers will feel a sense of responsibility 
for the hanns caused by the products they assemble;(4) 
wage and benefit increases in the future are likely to be 
limited by government controls; (5) unions and workers 
will not support a further shortening of the work week; 
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(6) union bargaining on environmental issues can 
produce solutions carefully tailored to the needs of both 
the corporation and the workers and (7) workers and 
unions will begin to accept long-term welfare as a 
legitimate factor in bargaining goals. 42 In the following 
pages, I will briefly discuss some of the considerations 
related to each of these factors. 
Of the first, it would seem that workers bear a relatively 
large share of the burden of environmental, safety, and 
consumer harms. Unlike the rich, workers cannot afford 
to insulate themselves from the effects of pollution. 
Workers tend to live in areas in which there is something 
wrong with the environment-perhaps there is extensive 
smoke pollution or a noisy freeway running through the 
housing tract. For instance, in Los Angeles the major 
lower-class bedroom communities are located in the 
worst smog sections of the city; most of the rich, 
however, live in the hills above the smog or on the ocean 
beach where the westerly winds always clear the air. 
There is no denying that the poor suffer most severely of 
all in our society from the environmental harms which 
prevail today. Yet, compared to an empty stomach or a 
ghetto apartment with rats, an excess of hyrodocarbons 
in the air is not a significant harm. The environmental, 
safety, and consumer issues are essentially middle-class 
issues. Not only has the frenetic production of 
technological society created the dirt which fills the air, 
but it has also made it possible to sense that dirt in the 
air is harmful, for only when one is above the poverty 
line does one dramtically sense the consequence of 
environmental deprivations. The worker is part of the 
economic class of Americans who are poor enough to be 
trapped in the polluted environment, yet rich enough to 
be motivated by environmental harms. 
The second factor which is likely to motivate environ-
mental bargaining is the increase in the "discretionary 
income" of workers. Discretionary income is a term used 
to describe the income of a family which is above and 
beyond that needed to provide for the basics of the 
contemporary standard of living. At the present time, 
income above $7500 is considered discretionary. 43 
When a worker is making less than $7500, there is a 
tendency to focus on "bread and butter" issues. As 
income rises above $7500, there might be some 
willingness to trade-off short-term, self-interest gains for 
longer-term, and possibly community-interest gains. 
Data on incomes indicates that family units which make 
over $10,000 44 will increase by 23 million by 1975. 
This means that the portion of families making over 
$10,000 will climb from 17% to 50% of the total 
number of families in the six teen years from 1959 to 
1975. 45 A large portion of this increase will be made up 
of families headed by workers. 
At least one study indicates that blue-collar workers do 
not duplicate white-collar spending habits, even when 
they make as much or more than their white-collar 
counterparts. 46 This may mean that blue-collar workers 
will be more willing to make the trade-off between 
additional income and environmental issues. 
There are, however, strong contrary considerations in 
this area of blue-collar discretionary income. For 
instance, a government study of family income of 
blue-collar and white-collar workers concluded: 
"White-collar workers earn more money on a weekly basis, 
enjoy more fringe benefits, have a safer work environment, 
and are more steadily employed, and opportunities for 
advancement are more abundant." 47 
Commenting on these findings, a labor statistician wrote, 
The current pressure by blue-collar workers through collective 
bargaining for substantial wage adjustments may represent not 
merely a temporary phenomenon, but a deep-seated attempt 
to match the advantages, economic and otherwise, accruing to 
those in higher level occupations. 48 
And finally, the au tho rs of a recent book, Aspirations 
arid Affluence, concluded that 
... even a substantial increase in income may be viewed as 
unsatisfactory and may not give rise to optimistic 
expectations. 
People's perceptions and expectations reflect not only their 
actual situation but also their underlying attitudes. They 
reflect both the changes in the financial condition of the 
individual and his subjective notions about whether he has 
been making progress .... 49 
But the role of "subjective notions" may not preclude a 
positive forecast concerning the worker's interests in 
environmental issues. Because of the wage-price spiral, 
workers could lose interest in large wage demands; it 
seems possible that as the environment grows 
increasingly putrid, workers may consider exchanging 
cash for guarantees from the corporation that products 
will not pollute. 
The third factor'is the sense of responsibility workers 
feel for the products they assemble. Since the days of 
craftsmen, the worker's relationship to his work-both 
the means of production and the ends of production-
has become more and more estranged. Workers are given 
no control over the consequences of their productive 
activity. Yet when a paper mill pollutes a river, the 
workers are participants in the illegal act. Some workers 
are reportedly unhappy with the present state of affairs: 
'whether the public gets a good, useful, and meaningful 
product from the business where the union man or woman 
works has an impact on [union] members. It is not very 
"Workers bear a relatively large share of the 
burden of environmental, safety or consumer harms." 
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pleasant to spend eight hours in a shop and then come out to 
hear everyone complain about the product. It makes your toil 
appear meaningless. 50 
This seems to reflect a revival of the craftsman's sense of 
responsibility for the quality and consequences of one's 
labor. Its growth should be a positive step in gaining 
worker support for environmental issues. 
In regard to the fourth factor, if wage and price 
restrictions continue for any length of time (as some 
predict they will 51 ), unions may exchange wage 
demands for environmental demands. This is only a 
significant factor for the purpose of this discussion if 
such environmental clauses are not computed into wage 
and price increases; otherwise, the union would find it 
more advantageous to take everything in wage and 
benefit increases. 
While one's first response may be to suspect that within 
a system of wage and price controls the government will 
promulgate some method of computing the cost of 
collective-bargained environmental clauses, there are 
some reasons to think this might not occur. First, the 
benefit from environmental clauses does not accrue 
directly to the worker, for a major portion of the benefit 
flows to the public. Second, the computation of the cost 
of environmental clauses will be very difficult. Unlike 
union negotiated pension and welfare funds, where 
actuarial data can be accurately developed, the specific 
effect of alterations in the product will be difficult to 
sort out from other external factors affecting price, such 
as demand. 52 Third, a change in the product and 
commensurate increase in price would constitute a 
non-inflatiortary increase since presumedly value has 
been added to the product. 
The fifth factor is that union leaders may not be willing 
to bargain for short work weeks; if that is so, a likely 
alternative is fringe benefit bargaining, in.eluding 
environmental issues. Leonard Woodcock said he was 
opposed to the thirty hour week because it raised the 
likelihood that workers would take a second job. While 
many workers are interested in taking second jobs, such 
"moonlighting" is a threat to the job security of other 
workers. Obviously, Woodcock's aversion to the thirty 
hour week does not lead inexorably to bargaining on 
environmental issues, but environmental bargaining is 
one way of creating worker interest in the union. 
In addition, at some point, workers may feel that the 
benefit gained from an extra hour of leisure is worth less 
than the gain he receives from collectively bargained 
clauses which require the employer to reduce pollution. 
The Steelworkers who refused to work until a higher 
grade of coal was burned in the company's coke ovens 
already seem to be at this point. 53 
Sixth, union initiated collective bargaining may be more 
responsive to the competing interests of long-term 
benefit to society and short-term economic stability of 
both the firm and the union. This could lead to an 
attempt by unions to preempt government regulation of 
corporations by negotiating similar, but somewhat less 
restrictive environmental standards than those proposed 
by government. Since the union stands to lose jobs in 
most all upward price shifts in the market, it will tailor 
its demands to closely fit the economic situation of the 
firm. On a theoretical level this will reduce the benefit 
gained by society, but in a practical, real-world sense, 
this form of decentralized decision making may prevent 
the gross maladjustments which invariably accompany 
government intervention. 54 
Finally, wage earners and unions may increasingly 
recognize that community interest is a legitimate goal of 
collective bargaining. Unions, while closely tied to the 
economic conditions of the firms they relate to, have 
often attempted to frame their struggle in broad terms 
which extend to all of society. Even now American 
unions are attempting to raise the wage-levels in foreign 
countries, admittedly to insure the continued economic 
security of the American worker. 55 But compared to 
support of high tariffs, such activity reflects a broader 
perspective which reaches beyond short-term self-
interest. 
Getting union members to identify with community 
interests is not easy; recently one UAW official discussed 
the current situation: 
We have a tremendous social problem in convincing these 
people (especially those not here when the union was 
organized) that the interest of society as a whole is greater 
than their own personal interest. They have to develop new 
values to understand this situation. 56 
But the increasing number of local unions which are 
willing to support environmental programs indicates that 
workers can identify their own self-interest with that of 
the community. And as the world becomes even more 
complexly interrelated, the effect of short-sighted 
bargaining agreements will become more and more 
obvious to the worker. In less than fifty years, share-
holders and corporate managers have internalized 
long-term profit as the standard for corporate decision 
making. Workers should be capable of a similar 
transition. 
These seven factors may increase the probability that 
unions will bargain for environmental protection clauses 
in work contracts. Perhaps with proper cultivation their 
positive effect can be augmented. But whether they are 
sufficient to overcome the inherent tension between the 
immediate consequences of forcing a corporation to 
internalize the cost of its pollution and the traditional 
goals of the labor movement is not easily answered. 
As is true tor corporate management, the shareholder, 
and indeed all of society, unions must strive to make 
"long-term" and "community-wide" part of their 
55 
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concept of self-interest. Sacrificing "bread and butter" 
does not come "naturally" to unions or to workers. 
To the extent that they are able to redefine their 
interests, unions may be a significant force for corporate 
social responsibility. 
III Legal Problems 
Industry-wide bargaining for environmental and 
consumer clauses in collective bargaining agreements 
raises a number of legal questions. First, will · 
management bargain on such issues? Is the subject one 
which the National Labor Relations Board will rule 
comes within the bounds of "mandatory bargaining" or, 
in the alternative, is there sufficient commonality of 
interests that management will desire to bargain on such 
issues. 62 Second, does such industry-wide bargaining by 
the UAW stand up after detailed analysis of its 
relatio_D.ship to the antitrust exemption granted in the 
Clayton Act? 
The Taft-Hartley Act. 
One important question in the context of American 
labor law is whether the National Labor Relations Board 
and the courts will rule that the issue is a mandatory 
subject of bargaining under the Taft-Hartley Act. 63 The 
Legal Assistant to Gerald A. Brown, one of the NLRB's 
five members, has written recently that 
... without some expectation of a finding that this is a 
mandatory subject [of bargaining] , it seems unlikely that the 
manufacturers will bargain seriously. The history of pollution 
control, in the automotive industry no less than in any other, 
gives little cause for hope that the manufacturers will welcome 
the opportunity to bargain in this area. 64 
Such mandatory bargaining under the Taft-Hartley Act 
would be required if the NLRB and the courts ruled that 
the pollution emissions of an automobile are related to 
the "conditions of employment" of the workers in the 
UAW. 65 Just looking at the term, "condition of 
employment", there would seem to be two ways of 
arguing that pollution emissions are included within the 
reach of the words. 
The first tack is one recommended by Jesse Etelson in 
an article 66 published shortly after Reuther's death and 
just before the inaugaration of bargaining talks between 
the UAW and General Motors in 1970. Essentially, 
Etelson's argument is that (1) cases hold "travel to and 
from work" to be a condition of employment, (2) travel 
to and from work includes driving on the highways, (3) 
the air pollution through which an auto worker must 
drive is the result of the product his employer manu-
factures, ( 4) the reduction of pollutive emissions of 
automobiles is a condition of employment for an 
employee of the automotive industry and is, therefore, a 
subject of mandatory bargaining. 
Conditions of employment as interpreted by the NLRB 
and the courts has not been limited to the boundaries of 
the plant; "the statutory phrase ... has not been 
regarded as having fixed boundaries in space." 67 Cases 
have held both company-provided housing and eating 
facilities near the plant to be a condition of employ-
ment. 68 The gist of these rulings has been that "the 
advantages of living near to the place of work in an area 
where housing was in demand materially affect the 
conditions of employment." The court must be referring 
to the higher costs of a longer journey-to-work, such as 
increased financial cost, increased time, and increased 
safety risk. 
It would be likely, suggests Etelson, that in addition to 
these travel saving devices (meals and housing), the 
Board and courts would make such subjects as parking 
facilities for employees mandatory; or the Board and 
courts would make split-shifts to relieve traffic 
congestion a subject of mandatory bargaining. Costs 
incurred in travel to and from work are a condition of 
employment to the extent that the employer can affect 
those costs. 69 To travel to and from work means to 
come in contact with debilitating pollutants which smog 
the air. Etelson concludes from this that it seems 
... (p]erfectly reasonable, therefore, for employees to demand 
of their employers to discuss meaningfully with them those 
measures, if any, which the employer has the capacity to 
undertake which could protect the employee's health against 
these hazards. 70 
Employers, of course, vary in their ability to affect the 
factors which impinge on a worker as he travels to and 
from work. Admittedly, the group of manufacturers 
whose end product significantly affects travel to and 
from work is a limited category: the two key industries 
within the category are the automobile manufacturers 
and the fuel refineries. On the other hand, the list of 
industries whose means of production affects the travel 
environment easily covers every power-consuming 
operation and thus the list is coextensive with 
productive activity in its entirety. Thus steel-workers 
have requested negotiation on the amount of smoke 
produced _by the smelters in Pittsburgh. 71 
Moreover, the analysis could be applied to industries 
which pollute only indirectly, that is through the 
consumption in their productive process of material 
which itself causes pollution when it is produced. For 
example the aluminum industry employs a process 
which creates little.direct pollution, but which uses a 
large quantity of electricity. The aluminum workers 
could demand that the aluminum companies purchase 
clean electrical power or they might demand that the 
aluminum industry conduct research into the feasibility 
of using other, cleaner sources of power in the produc-
tion of aluminum. 
The second approach to the problem of making 
environmental bargaining come within the statutory 
definition of "condition of employment" is no less 
far-reached in its consequences than the first. The 
argument is that the products "assembled" by the 8
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worker relate to the conditions of his employment in 
that they constitute his mark on or addition to the social 
order. In the process of history, the worker ex presses 
himself with his work product; therefore, the worker 
wants that product to reflect, at least in part, his 
sensibilities and his personality. This concept of a 
condition of employment is most cleaily seen in 
relationship to organized teachers; their right to control 
the subject matter of their teaching is clearly recognized 
by the union as an essential tenet. in any collective 
bagaining agreement. 72 Management (more neutrally 
called administration in the academic fields) has long 
recognized that this is a proper concern of their 
employees when the industry is based on intellectual 
endeavor, but where the industry is not intellectual, 
there is no tradition of worker control of the end 
product. Much could be said for the increase in worker 
satisfaction (and sense of responsibility) which would 
result from allowing the worker to assist in the decisions 
about the products of a corporation. At the present time 
the only option of the worker is to refuse to work for a 
corporation which produces goods which do not meet 
his personal standards, for neither corporations nor the 
courts have recognized that control of the end product is 
a "condition of employment." 73 
Obviously, both of these arguments-the one relating to 
the costs of the journey-to-work and the second to the 
productive process itself-constitute a broad reading of 
"condition of employment." Such a reading conflicts to 
some extent with traditional though vague labor law 
notions of managerial perogative. Thus the UAW, in 
bargaining over emission levels of automobiles, is 
necessarily attempting to effect product-design. In the 
past, product design has been considered a fast and firm 
segment of management prerogatives, that "never-never 
bargaining land" where management has reigned 
supreme. 
Three justices of the Supreme Court in their concurring 
opinion in Fibreboard v. NLRB said that "product 
design" is one of those subjects of which 
... it is hardly conceivable that such decisions so involve 
"conditions of employment" that they must be negotiated 
with the employee's bargaining representative. 74 
But, in making this statement, the justices were viewing 
product design from the perspective that the con-
sequences of design never affect the worker in the course 
of his employment. This dictum seems to mean that if 
product design did affect conditions of employment to a 
significant degree, then product design would also be 
subject to mandatory bargaining. 
The traditional sway of management in matters such as 
product design does not dispose of the iss.ue of 
mandatory collective bargaining, 75 nor is it necessary to 
balance the benefit gained by the employee against the 
loss to the employer, except in those cases where the 
benefit to employees is so small as to not significantly 
affect the conditions of employment. 76 
There is, on the other hand, a need to consider the 
feasibility of reaching settlement when a subject such as 
product design is being considered for inclusion within 
the scope of mandatory bargaining. Etelson suggests that 
a case-by-case method where each side presents their 
argument as to the character of the bargaining process in 
their industry may be the best method of preparing the 
NLRB to decide whether mandatory bargaining over the 
pollution control systems of automobiles "will 
contribute more to industrial peace or to industrial 
chaos." 77 There is a presumption in favor of a broad 
view of mandatory collective bargaining expressed in the 
"Findings and Policies" section of the Taft-Hartley 
Act 78 and recent Supreme Court rulings indicate an 
acceptance of this presumption. 19 The NLRB may not 
want to broaden the play of the "travel to and from 
work" argument developed by Etelson to areas where it 
interferes directly with management control of product 
design. It may also have some undefined fear that 
acceptance of either argument put forth above would 
"open up" the bargaining process too much. More 
reasoned analysis, however, seems to indicate that a 
broadened definition of ''conditions of employment" 
would not result in any redistribution of bargaining 
power. Professor Wellington has summarized the 
dynamic: 
Under the Labor-Management Relations Act [Taft-Hartley 
Act) , the private em ploy er has to bargain in good faith over 
"wages, hours" and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment. It is through this statutory provision that the law exerts 
leverage on the subjects of bargaining; and the general 
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trend has been to expand the legal definition. However, an 
expanded legal definition of terms and conditions of 
employment means, with respect to matters having a financial 
impact, that, if a union negotiates an agreement over more 
subjects, it generally trades off more of less for less of more. 80 
A decision by the NLRB which rejected the arguments 
suggested would not, however, be fatal to the effort by 
labor to bargain over environmental issues. Mandatory 
bargaining gives either party the power to "legally insist 
upon its position as a condition to any agreement and 
thereby torpedo the negotiations." 81 Even without the 
mandatory bargaining designation, unions would still be 
able to raise the issues, although they could not insist on 
them. How much of a difference the distinction between 
mandatory and non-mandatory subjects of bargaining 
makes in the real world of management-labor relations is 
subject to some dispute. 82 
Furthermore, creative litigation on these subjects by 
unions could lead to an extended definition of 
"conditions of employment" which not only 
encompassed the harms suffered during travel to and 
from work, but the harms perpetrated on the worker's 
family while he ·is at work and the harms the worker 
himself suffers during his leisure hours. 83 While such 
extension of the statutory phrase "conditions of 
employment" goes far beyond anything the drafters of 
the Taft-Hartley Act had in mind, it does not necessarily 
extend beyond the policy in support of collective 
bargaining enunciated in the Taft-Hartley Act. Collective 
bargaining as envisioned in this legislation was designed 
to give the worker parity of bargaining power over the 
fundamental aspects of his relationship to his employer. 
In earlier times, these fundamental matters consisted of 
wages, hours, and a limited number of conditions related 
to employment. 84 But as the standard of living increases 
in the United States, critical issues shift from the gross 
matters of wages to the margin where safety, lack of 
pollution, and enjoyment oflife are seemingly funda-
mental. There is strong evidence of this shift in the 
following statement of an international union official: 
Union members have a big stake in consumer protection. That 
stake increases every time a union is successful at the 
bargaining table. As unions win greater benefits for their 
members, as union members get deeper and deeper into the 
middle class, as contracts get farther and farther away from 
conditions of basic survival, the union member obviously 
becomes more and more of a consumer-a buyer. The 
problems of the marketplace become increasingly important to· 
him. He is ever more conscious of prices, slack fill, truthful 
labelling, product safety, consumer fraud, warranties, credit 
reporting, and so on.85 
For the worker, the question is no longer necessarily 
wages and hours, for there may be basically adequate 
wages and reasonably short working hours; instead, the 
worker may desire to increase the psychological 
satisfaction he obtains from his work, to insure that his 
family is safe and healthy, and to increase the value of 
the wages and leisure he has gained from past collective 
bargaining by insuring that his total environment is clean 
and safe. To the extent that a worker wishes to bargain 
on these items, they become issues which should be 
included within collective bargaining. 
In summary, the Taft-Hartley Act is designed to expand 
with the contemporary view of the conditions of 
employment. As worker values and motivation shift 
environmental, safety, and consumer issues should move 
within the scope of conditions of employment. 
Industry-wide Environmental 
Bargaining and Antitrust 
Collective bargaining, when it is based on employee 
organization along product-market lines, creates strong 
anti-competitive incentives in both labor and manage-
ment. 86 Examples of employee organization along 
product-market lines include most all of the major 
unions in the United States; 87 for instance, the 
Steelworkers not only represent the general class of 
workers who handle basic metals, but bargain along the 
major product lines within that category (steel, brass) 
and the UAW negotiates (through the use ofpattern-
bargaining) 88 with the automakers in one year, with the 
au top arts industry in another year, and with aerospace 
industry at another time. 
In an over-simplified explanation, these anti-competitive 
incentives mentioned above exist because (l) the union 
can maximize its gains by limiting the competitive 
interplay between the firms making the same product 
and (2) other factors remaining constant (which in this 
case they have a tendency to do), the union has the 
ability to determine the firm's position in the product 
market by varying labor cost demands. While one might 
assume that it is to the union's best interest to drive the 
cost of labor as higlras each firm can bear, this overlooks 
the consequence such labor costs may have on the firm's 
position in the product market and the subsequent 
effect on the union's gains. Almost an identical analysis 
explains the tendency of corporations to attempt to gain 
control of product markets through the use of anti-
competitive devices. 
Labor law, including the exemption of unions from the 
antitrust laws, is not predicated on national economic 
policy but relies instead on the "conflict of interest 
between labor and management to neutralize the market 
power created by collective bargaining." 89 There is a 
real question whether such conflict of interest exists in 
areas traditionally covered 
by antitrust laws. Collective bargaining produces 
limitations on competition which go far beyond those 
necessary for correcting the imperfections of the labor 
market. This, combined with management's interest in 
limiting competition, means that collective bargaining 
often leads to the im£iosition of substantial restraints on 
the product market. A union's aim of obtaining a 
favorable settlement for its members requires not only 
organizing the labor force, but influencing the position 
of the firm in the product market and the product 
market itself. 
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Winter contends that this behavior on the part of unions 
is part and parcel of pursuing its own self-interest: 
Unions in competitive industries have great incentive to 
restrain competition between employers as a matter of 
self-defense. 91 
In fact, Winter argues, there is no limit on union 
incentive, and often union power, to impose monopoly 
on product markets. 92 
Furthermore, there are no substantive principles upon 
which to rest judicial decisions in the area of labor 
disputes and antitrust. The Sherman Act and the 
National Labor Relations Act 93 do not provide for the 
resolution of the competing interests of competition and 
collective bargaining; instead each act enunciates total 
support for a policy for competition or for collective 
bargaining. 
Because of the irreconcilable nature of the policy conflict and 
the statutory indifference to the problem, there is no principle 
upon which we can distinguish "legitimate" collective 
bargaining from "illegitimate" monopolization .... Whatever 
distinctions are employed for the purpose of regulation must, 
therefore, be largely arbitrary, for there are no generalized 
principles which harmonize the conflicting policies. 94 
The Supreme Court has grappled with this quandry for 
the past sixty-five years; Congress has at times inter-
ceded, but never with clarity. The product of the Court's 
six decades of balancing the policies of competition and 
collective bargaining provides only ambiguous guidelines 
for those union leaders who wish to pursue industry-
wide collective bargaining. 
The first forty years of that history culminated in the 
decision in U.S. v. Hutchenson 95 that "union activity in 
pursuit of economic self-interest is exempt from the 
Anti-trust Laws." 96 
This plain resolution of the problem was undermined 
four years later, in Allen-Bradley v. Local 3 of the 
!BEW. 97 Local 3 of the International Brotherhood of 
Electrical Workers was located in New York City and 
had collective agreements with most of the electrical 
equipment manufacturers and contractors in New York 
City. Through the use of these collective agreements, 
Local 3 got the manufacturers to agree to sell electrical 
equipment only to contractors who employed members 
of Local 3 and got the contractors to agree to buy only 
from manufacturers who had agreements with Local 3. 
The result was that prices on electrical equipment went 
up, wages were higher and hours shorter, and outsiders 
were denied access to the New York market. Local 3 was 
acting in its own economic self-interest. But as the court 
noted, such union activity was effectively allowing 
business to engage in activity which made the Sherman 
Act a "futile gesture." 98 
In its opinion, the Supreme Court implied that the facts 
of Allen-Bradley were dispositive of the conflict between 
antitrust and collective bargaining policy because the 
businesses in Allen-Bradley were the initiators of the 
combination. Yet even the judicial facts indicate that it 
was the union and not the businesses which organized 
and brought about the monopoly. 99 
Resurrecting a phrase from Hutchenson, the Court made 
much of the "combination with non-labor groups" of 
Local 3. But when does a union not combine with the 
employer when it obtains a collective bargaining 
agreement? The Court said, 
But when the unions participated with a combination of 
businessmen who had complete power to eliminate all 
competition among themselves and to prevent competition 
from others, a situation was created not included within the 
exemptions of the Clayton and Norris-La Guardia Acts. ' 00 
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But, as Winter points out, this was an unsatisfactory 
answer: 
Allen-Bradley ... was an attempt to prohibit what the Court 
thought were flagrant union activities. But its real purpose was 
obscured by the "business monopoly" test, a standard which 
not only impairs many aspects of collective bargaining but is 
also extraordinarily unrealistic.'0 ' 
For the next twenty years, judicial activity in the 
conflict between an ti trust policy and collective 
bargaining came to a halt. Congress was active, passing 
the Taft-Hartley Act, the Hobbs Anti-Racketeering Act, 
and the Landrum-Griffin Act. 102 Many of the 
irregularities which the Court had attempted to curb 
through the use of antitrust doctrine were prohibited by 
these acts. The Court had the opportunity to dis-
continue its use of the "guideless antitrust laws to 
regulate union activities as doubly awkward and 
inappropriate." 103 But in 1965, it handed down two 
rulings which reactivated its use of the antitrust laws to 
control union activity. These cases were the United Mine 
Workers v. Pennington 104 and Jewel Tea. 105 
In Pennington, the United Mine Workers had a series of 
agreements with the major coal operators to raise wages 
and drive the smaller union and non-union operators 
from the market. To a limited number of mine workers, 
higher wages were beneficial; to many, higher wages 
mean unemployment. As for the operators, high wages 
pennitted them to automl!te-that is, if they were large 
enough to be able to afford to automate. 
In Jewel Tea, the Meat Cutters Local 189 in Chicago 
restricted the sale of fresh meat among 9000 retailers to 
the hours of 9 a.m. to 6 p.m .. There was no allegation of 
conspiracy here, rather the issue was 
whether the marketing-hours restriction, like wages ... is so 
intimately related to wages, hours and working conditions that 
the unions' successful attempt to obtain the provision through 
bona fide, arm's-length bargaining in pursuit of their own labor 
union policies ... falls within the protection of national labor 
policy and is therefore exempt from the Sherman Act. The 
crncial determinant is not the form of the agreement-e.g. 
wages or prices-but its relative impact on the product market 
and the interests of union members. (footnote included in 
text)' 06 [emphasis added) 
This is the distinction of Apex, shaped into a balancing 
test; as in Apex, the distinction is of little value. Yet the 
Court found the activity of the meat cutters to be 
legitimate. In Pennington, the Court remanded the case, 
saying that 
the alleged agreement between UMW and the large operators 
to secure uniform labor standards throughout the industry, if 
proved, was not exempt from the antitrust laws.' 07 
Winter comments 
If Pennington is right-indeed, if Allen-Bradley is right-the 
federal courts may, in no small number of circumstances, 
enjoin primary strikes for higher wages at the behest of private 
parties. ' 08 
Not only have Pennington and Jewel been characterized 
as showing unanimous assent by the nine justices to one 
basic proposition: 
The power of the judiciary to regulate under antitrust laws, 
matters which also fall within the regulatory scheme of the 
labor laws, 109 
but furthermore, the three separate opinions seem in 
agreement on two issues: 
(1) if the defendant's agreement were indeed upon a man-
datory subject of bargaining and there were no independent 
evidence of such agreement being in aid of a conspiracy among 
non-labor groups, liability could not attach under the antitrust 
laws; 
(2) it is for the court, when faced with a claimed violation of 
the antitrust laws, to determine whether the agreement at bar 
really did involve an issue which employers and unions are 
required to bargain. 110 
If that is the meaning of Pennington and Jewel, there is 
still little upon which to predict the Court's response to 
industry-wide bargaining on environmental issues. As 
Winter indicated above, primary strikes for higher wages 
could be enjoined as contrary to antitrust law. And as 
other labor law commentators have noted, 
Obviously a hostile finder of fact could have concluded in 
Jewel Tea that there was no necessary relationship between 
hours of work and hours of sales of meat. In that situation, the 
Court apparently would have sustained a treble-damages award 
against the union.' 11 
The Court will be hard put to make meaningful the 
distinction between permitted and illegal union activity. 
And the ad hoc decisions of previous days will continue 
to be the rule. 
What can we draw from this long and ambiguous series 
of cases? The first conclusion is that it may not be the 
NLRB, but the courts which first detennines if 
environmental clauses are mandatory subjects of 
collective bargaining. This significantly alters both the 
procedure which will be used in making the decision and 
the substantive factors which will be considered in the 
decision. 
The NLRB, an administrative body, would have 
approached the question as an unfair labor practice. The 
Board would have been able to use its ability to 
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construct an extensive record, to make findings and to 
develop "expertise." Its decisions have traditionally had 
a flexibility which matches the shifting relationship of 
labor and management. Labor and management enter 
the fray as nominal adversaries 112 and the consequences 
for labor of an adverse decision - NLRB: a remedial order; 
courts: treble damages 113 -are radically different. 
The NLRB is a political body, solving what most 
commentators see as essentially political, partisan 
problems. 114 It makes its decisions on mandatory 
bargaining within the framework established by the 
National Labor Relations Act which emphasizes 
labor-management peace and order and the positive 
support of collective bargaining. 
The procedural limitations of the courts are well known. 
As to substantive factors, the essential difference in the 
courts' handling of labor disputes using the antitrust 
laws is that the courts have to balance policies of 
collective bargaining and antitrust simultaneously. The 
lack of success of this enterprise has been well docu-
mented by the courts themselves: there are competing 
forces at work here which stymie the development of 
principle, yet the Supreme Court has persisted in 
attempting to settle such issues. 
In terms of the balance between collective bargaining 
and antitrust, environmental bargaining would seem to 
stand little chance of being granted mandatory status by 
the courts. The UA W's proposal for cleaner cars is 
designed to benefit society-certainly in that sense it is a 
more acceptable goal than that of the electrical workers 
in Allen-Bradley. But is it clearly distinguishable from 
the purpose of the United Mine Worker's plan for the 
coal mines of West Virginia which surfaced in 
Pennington? 
Reuther most likely understood that market forces and 
antitrust law prevented the major automakers from 
adopting stringent pollution standards, so he stepped 
into the breach. When John L. Lewis began acting like a 
"labor statesman" and worked out his plan for the coal 
mines the subject was automation, not pollution. The 
coal mine operators were in no position to automate 
because they could not control their market sufficiently 
to bear the enormous initial cost of automating. Lewis 
provided the control and gave the world cheap coal-yet 
the Supreme Court would not approve his plan. Is clean 
air a purer goal? 
Perhaps the conspiracy between the UMW and the coal 
operators was the determinative issue in Pennington. 
Would the UAW get past this test when the plaintiff 
introduces the contracts agreed to by Ford, GM, and 
Chrysler? Justice Goldberg certainly thought the Court 
in Pennington failed to "understand the practical 
realities of the automobile, steel ... and numerous other 
industries which follow the policy of pattern 
bargaining. m 
Perhaps one must take a cue from Jewel Tea: is there an 
intimate relationship between the environmental clause 
and the wages, hours, and working conditions of this 
industry? Justice White attempted to gauge the relative 
impact of the meat cutters agreements on the product 
market and on the interest of union members. 116 As has 
been mentioned before, this test, for all of its simplicity, 
provides no substantive principle upon which to decide a 
specific issue. The Court will review the evidence and 
rule; but, as Winter commented, "it will [be] an 
unprincipled and largely arbitrary judgement." 117 The 
lesson of Jewel may be to carefully construct the trial 
record, for, as was true in Jewel, the case may be won or 
lost at that level. 
But even in view of the ad hoc character of the decisions 
the Supreme Court has handed down in the past, there 
seems to be enough of a pattern in the Court's ruling to 
suggest one final, tentative conclusion. Those who 
seriously contemplate industry-wide environmental 
bargaining will have a difficult time convincing the 
Supreme Court that the labor exemption from antitrust 
laws extends to their activities. Not only must one lay 
the foundation for such activities with care, but one 
must do it without benefit of plumb line or square. 
In summary, the legal milieu for bargaining on environ-
mental issues, while not particularly hospitable, is also 
not preclusive of bargaining. 
IV Union Environmental Bargaining 
and Legitimacy 118 
A major student of labor unions recently provided the 
following comment on the source of union policies: 
From the popular or non-academic viewpoint, trade unions of 
the West have often been viewed as institutions sensitive and 
working for social improvement and betterment; ... that trade 
unions and their policies are forged in the heat of the interest 
of the great mass of the people and the nation at large .... 
That this institutional vehicle, directed and contained by 
the track of collective bargaining was laid securely in the 
roadbed of industrial organization has not always been 
clearly seen. The economic success or failure of unions was 
and is closely related to the industrial complex in which 
they exist. 119 
This introduces what I think is an essential problem. If 
unions are so closely related to the industrial complex in 
which they exist, can they, any more than the consumer 
or corporate management, represent the interest of the 
community at large? 
The first part of the answer is that to the ex tent that the 
unions represent interests which are co-extensive with 
those of the community-for instance, with consumers 
or victims of pollution-the union can be a legitimate 
source of corporate responsibility. Unions represent 
interests of some sections of society which are 
apparently absent from (or at least ineffectively 
represented in) the mix of factors which are used to 
make corporate decisions. Workers represented by 
unions come from a broad cross-section of the lower and 
middle classes of American society and, with the 
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"The solution may be to insure 
that jobs are not lost, or 
that job assistance is provided 
when pollution ... standards 
are implemented." 
noteworthy exception of blacks and the poor, union 
members are representative of those in America who 
suffer most significantly from the ills associated with 
pollution, product safety, and consumer protection. 120 
After all, union members are consumers and victims of 
pollution. But because the union is somewhat 
representative does not necessarily mean that it should 
act as an agent of society in controlling the behavior of 
corporations. 
The second part of the answer is that to the extent that 
unions are controlled by the economic factors which 
determine the behavior of the corporation, the union is 
not a better source of corporate responsibility. The 
tendency of unions to pursue monopoly control of the 
product market is one example of an area where unions 
and corporate management seem to stand in the same 
relationship to society.The.environmental backlash 
occurring in many local unions is another example of the 
close identity between corporate and union interests 
which works to diminish the unions's ability to serve the 
community in general. However, to the extent that 
unions are able to redefine their interests as long-term in 
nature, they can be seen as a legitimate source of social 
control. 
Third, of the four traditional sources of control over the 
corporation-ownership, government, the market, and 
organized labor-unions may be in the best position to 
provide effective control. 
-The split between ownership and control has 
effectively insulated corporate management from 
accountability to stockholders. 121 
-Government officials perceive themselves as too 
dependent upon the support of corporate management 
to undertake effective steps to control the 
corporation. 122 
-Consumers are too lacking in information and too 
fragmented to-control the corporation effectively. 
-Labor unions, however, may not fall victim to these 
shortcomings. 
The classical source of rational control over the quality, 
quantity, and character of the ends of production has 
been the corporation responding to the demands and 
desires of the consumer, that is, the market. To the 
extent that the consumer within the market controls the 
corporation, corporate decision making is considered 
neutral and the consumer is seen as the participant in the 
market process who provides value inputs. Materials and 
labor are also considered neutral factors, especially in 
comparison to the inputs of the consumer. For instance, 
the supply of copper does not move in the market with 
attached provisions that it be used only for peaceful 
purposes. Instead, copper flows to the highest bidder. 
Labor has traditionally followed suit. As a rule, labor has 
not argued about what it was helping to manufacture, 
instead it followed the market. As everyone knows, 
unions were originally developed to overcome a major 
imperfection in the labor market, the fact that 
individual, unorganized workers were at the mercy of 
employers. Now, faced with a second market imperfec-
tion-the inability of the consumer to control 
corporate output through the use of demand-unions 
may attempt to solve this problem by adjusting the cost 
oflabor so as to control the output of corporations-
especially in terms of character and quality. Union 
bargaining on environmental issues is thus an attempt to 
control corpora ti! output through the use of the labor 
market. 
A brieflook at the present failure of the consumer to 
control the corporation through the use of demand in 
the product market indicates that at least three factors 
have rendered the consumer relatively powerless. First, 
advertising screens from the consumer's view the harms 
and disbenefits which come from products. In addition, 
advertising creates "false" demand among consumers. 
Consumer decisions are not made with adequate 
information, Jet alone perfect information. Secondly, 
consumer choice is incapable of reflecting all of the costs 
which should be included in the price of products. 
Thirdly, the market is beyond the control of the 
consumer. The supreme concern of corporate 
management for growth and security means that they 
must manipulate the consumer. 123 
When a union is bargaining on environmental issues, it is 
using its economic power in the labor market as a 
substitute for consumer control in the product market. 
As the earlier discussion of unions and antitrust Jaw 
indicated, unions are able to impose extensive control 
ove.r the product market, and the corporation's position 
in the Rroduct market, through its control over labor 
costs. 24 
Furthermore, as a substitute for the consumer, the union 
may not be affected by the deficiencies which make 
futile the attempt of consumers to control the corpora-
tion. First, the union has the ability to accumulate 
information far beyond the ability of the consumer. It 
not only has control over large financial and intellectual 
resources but can concentrate its information into a 
single series of intensive transactions-the contract 
negotiations. Secondly, because the union can spell out 
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its demands in detail, using express language instead of 
implicit shifts in demand, environmental bargaining can 
incorporate into the bargain a greater number of 
externalities than the consumer can. And third, the 
union has strong economic leverage against the 
corporation. Unlike the consumer, the union can strike 
and stop production. It can concentrate its demands into 
a single confrontation and can multiply the effect of the 
individual demands of its members into a significant 
force. For instance, General Motors estimates that every 
additional penny in a wage agreement represents $10 
million in labor costs. 125 
However, one must be cautious in assigning too much to 
unions; after all, their primary purpose is to collectively 
represent members as workers. In regard to this 
discussion, that means pursuing the basic issues of wages 
and hours. 126 But since wages are one of the methods 
by which the c:orporation creates consumer demand for 
its products, there may be less antagonism on the wage 
issue than current mythology allows; and hours (and 
leisure) may diminish in importance as bargaining issues 
in the future because of the effect of shorter work week 
has on job security and unemployment. There are, as I 
have already mentioned, a number of reasons to think 
that workers will be interested in making demands on 
the corporation which reflect their interests as consumer 
and victim of pollution more than they reflect their 
short-term interests as worker. 
The legitimacy of the labor union using collective 
bargaining to control corporations would seem to rest on 
three factors: first, the labor union contains within its 
membership representatives of at least two major 
segments of society-consumers and victims of 
pollution-which are presently incapable of protecting 
themselves from the power of the corporation; second, 
the labor union may be capable of defining its interests 
in social terms; third, the labor union has the economic 
strength and at least some of the structural character-
istics necessary to effectively control the corporation. 
To this extent, the labor union is a legitimate institution 
to assist in developing corporate social responsibility. 
V Conclusion, or the Beginning? 
Environmental Bargaining by labor unions is not the 
final answer to the problem of corporate social 
responsibility. And certainly environmentalists ought 
not look to this technique as the place to exert 
maximum effort. 
The real merit of the idea of environmental bargaining 
may be that it reawakens in us the perception that the 
union is a unique social organization with a unique 
opportunity to effect change. We need to remind 
ourselves that the union is the place in society where 
class conflict can be least disguised, and therefore where 
the political energy of labor is most intense. 
In the age of Hardhats for Nixon, one migltt well ask 
why that political energy is so diffuse, if not mis-
directed. Perhaps the labor movement suffers not so 
much from a lack of political strength, as from a 
narrowness of goals. Demands for immediate economic 
benefits like increased wages and pensions will not 
preserve the identity of the labor movement in a society 
of relative worker affluence. The unions, if they are 
successfully to reassert their autonomy, must move 
beyond the materialism of the American corporate state 
and demand that production be subordinated to the 
human needs of the producers. This is not an outlook 
wholly foreign to the American labor movement, whose 
origin lies partly in a concern with industrial democracy. 
But it is in new manifestations of that outlook, such as 
environmental bargaining, that the working movement 
may find new vigor and direction. And it is the burden 
of this article that within the context of American labor 
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